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1 
Introduction 
This is the final report for Dependable Computing’s contract #NNL13AA08C “Argument-Based 
Safety Assurance” in fulfillment of Items 17-20 of Exhibit B “Contract Deliverables 
Requirements”. The participants in this research project were: 
• Dependable Computing LLC, Charlottesville, VA.
• Barron Associates, Charlottesville, VA.
• Ferrell And Associates Consulting, Inc., Charlottesville, VA.
• The Department of Computer Science, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA.
The website that details the majority of the scientific results of this project is: 
http://www.dependablecomputing.com/class 
CLASS is a novel approach to the enhancement of system safety in which the system safety 
case becomes the focus of safety engineering [1]. CLASS also expands the role of the safety 
case across all phases of the system’s lifetime, from concept formation to decommissioning. As 
CLASS was developed, the concept was enhanced from a process and document focus to an 
information focus. The concept was also generalized to a more comprehensive notion of 
assurance becoming the driving goal, where safety is an important special case. 
The definition of a safety case given by the UK Ministry of Defence Standard 00–56, Safety 
Management Requirements for Defence Systems, is [2]: 
“The Safety Case shall consist of a structured argument, supported by a body of 
evidence, that provides a compelling, comprehensible and valid case that a system is 
safe for a given application in a given environment.” 
The structured argument referred to in this definition is a rigorous argument about properties 
of the subject system. The argument provides the explicit rationale for belief in a claim about the 
system. The claims made about the systems of interest to this research are safety claims. 
Nevertheless, the conclusions and concepts are influenced by and support the more general 
notion of assurance. 
Placing the safety case at the core of system development and analysis provides a number 
of benefits. Nevertheless, this concept only has value if the safety case is well maintained and 
always consistent with the system – a property we refer to as synchrony. Maintaining synchrony 
requires that a system and its safety case be regarded as a single, composite entity, always 
linked and always representing one another correctly. The need for system development to 
maintain synchrony in a precise, controlled manner is a fundamental principle upon which 
CLASS is based. 
CLASS was developed as a series of prototypes in an evolutionary manner. As CLASS 
evolved, various technologies were developed and added to CLASS with each new prototype. 
An important aspect of this project was the conduct of empirical studies of the concepts and 
ideas as they evolved. These empirical studies led to major changes to the various CLASS 
prototypes over the duration of the project. The major differences that arose during the 
development of CLASS are characterized as three phases. Phase 1 was the original concept. 
Phase 2 was an expanded and enhanced version of the original concept in which the notion of 
process dominated.  Phase 3 was a further enhancement in which information became the 
central focus of CLASS. 
Specific technical topics are only summarized in this report, because the details are 
documented in papers that have either been published or are under review. A bibliography of 
these papers is included at the end of the report. 
The reader of this report is assumed to be familiar with the essential background 
technologies upon which this research is based. These technologies are: 
• Modern system safety cases.
• Rigorous argument.
• The Goal Structuring Notation (GSN).
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• Safety engineering. 
• Safety-critical software engineering. 
• Aerospace systems. 
• Relevant regulatory processes. 
Safety Lifecycle 
Lifecycle Concept 
For a safety-critical system, many system elements have to function correctly and their 
functionalities have to compose in an appropriate way if a system of interest is to: 
• Be adequately safe. 
• Be considered adequately safe. 
• Remain adequately safe. 
Fundamentally, to achieve these properties a great deal of analysis is required across three 
critical dimensions: 
• Details of the system. 
• Contexts within which the system will be used. 
• Timeframes of system use. 
The focus of this research project was to address the system safety issue for complex 
aerospace systems where the basic mechanism of assurance is the safety case, in particular to 
examine the way in which a safety case can support safety assurance across the three critical 
dimensions listed above. 
Safety is an emergent property. An emergent property is one that is present at the system 
level as a result of various other properties held by system components and subsystems. In 
general, an adequate level of safety at the system level cannot be achieved or maintained if 
either: (a) analysis is limited to establishing properties of elements in isolation, or (b) analysis is 
undertaken for just part of the lifecycle, and, as a result, not managed properly as the subject 
system evolves over time. A system-wide, lifecycle view of safety is required if the safety 
requirements are to be met. 
Without a lifecycle view, two major difficulties can arise: 
• The assumptions made in development or operation of one system element might not be 
respected in other elements or subsystems. 
• The dependability requirements stated, achieved, or maintained by one system element 
might not be sufficient for other elements or subsystems. 
CLASS is a system-wide lifecycle based on safety cases that is designed to avoid these 
difficulties. 
Lifecycle Scope 
The engineering and assurance of complex, safety-critical systems for domains such as 
aerospace involve many different technologies and disciplines. The innovation brought to these 
domains by the introduction of safety cases displaces some technologies, enhances other 
technologies, and introduces yet other technologies. 
Some existing technologies are well established and successful, and are not influenced 
directly by the introduction of safety cases (although these technologies might and probably will 
provide evidence that becomes part of the safety case). Nevertheless, these technologies are 
influenced by the introduction of the safety-case lifecycle. CLASS addresses these technologies 
only to the extent that the technologies have to be adapted to work with the basic CLASS 
concepts, i.e., these technologies are considered to be out of scope except to the extent that 
they have to be enhanced to support CLASS. 
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CLASS Origins and Terminology 
The inspiration for CLASS was the concept of Assurance Based Development (ABD) [3, 4]. The 
fundamental concept of ABD is to drive the development of a software system from an 
assurance case for the software. All development decisions, including process steps and 
sequencing, originate from the creation of the assurance case. 
ABD was developed for software and has been demonstrated in that domain. CLASS was 
an effort to extent the concept in three dimensions: 
• The temporal dimension, i.e., to extent the concept to the complete system lifecycle, not 
just development. 
• The assurance dimension, i.e., to extend the concept to other dependability properties, 
not just the assurance of functional correctness of software. 
• The application dimension, i.e., to extend the concept to the subsystem and system 
levels, not just the software component. 
Over the period of performance of this project, CLASS was developed as a series of 
prototypes, each building on the previous one, that can be thought of as three different phases 
of CLASS. These phases and their major characteristics are illustrated in Fig. 1. 
Throughout the development of CLASS, aerospace domain experts were consulted 
regularly to provide assessment of the concepts. These consultations led to major 
enhancements to CLASS as the phases evolved. 
In the following three sections of this report, each phase of CLASS is discussed in order to 
show how CLASS evolved. Phase 1 built on Assurance Based Development. Phase 2 built on 
phase 1 and both enhanced the techniques developed in phase 1 and added new techniques. 
Phase 3 built on phase 2 and made a significant revision in which various underlying principles 
were revised and the associated technologies enhanced appropriately. 
Three important concepts that support CLASS and its evolution are: (a) the CLASS 
Resource Repository (CRR), (b) the Safety Information Repository (SIR), and (c) assurance 
analysis: 
 
Fig. 1. The three phases of CLASS that were developed over the period of performance. 
• CLASS Resource Repository. The CRR is a general repository that holds various 
resources likely to be of value to CLASS users. 
• Safety Information Repository. The SIR is a system-specific repository designed to 
hold all of the safety-related assurance information for a specific subject system over its 
lifetime. 
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• Assurance Analysis. Assurance analysis is integral to CLASS. The approach used by 
CLASS is based on the Filter Model introduced by Steele and Knight [5] and motivated a 
number of crucial elements of CLASS, in particular the monitoring system. 
These concepts are referred to frequently and discussed in depth at various points in this report. 
Four additional concepts, lifecycle, process, guidance and architecture, are summarized 
here so as to provide the reference framework for subsequent CLASS explanatory sections. 
• Lifecycle. Lifecycle represents the stages of a system in which the primary purpose or 
activity of the system differs. For example, an engineered system will have a stage 
during which it is created, and another stage during which it is operated. The primary 
goal of creation differs from operation. Each stage of a lifecycle is dominated by a 
purpose that differs from other stages. These purposes are goals for the system. They 
are divisible, so that a lifecycle stage might have sub-stages. A large system, such as a 
nuclear reactor, might have an online sub-stage and an offline maintenance sub-stage 
within its operation stage. Stages can cycle. The online and offline sub-stages, for 
example, might run many cycles during the operational stage of a nuclear power plant. 
• Processes. Processes represent activities to support a system in its various lifecycle 
stages. A process is a program (in an abstract sense) that exists to serve a lifecycle 
stage. It performs work in support of the lifecycle stage. In cybernetic systems (involving 
people and machines) its primary purpose is to coordinate human and automated 
actions, as well as track users and their tools, to assure the rules of the process are met. 
• Guidance. Guidance is a collection of qualitative statements and more detailed 
presentations designed to help users make decisions. At many points in a process, the 
documented content of a process must be created, or flow-chart decisions must be 
made. In both cases, capturing such creative input in process form is generally a poor 
idea. Instead, users must be informed through guidance mechanisms such as 
documents, expert systems, training, practice, and examples. 
• Architecture. Architecture is a means to implement lifecycle, process, and guidance. 
Architecture is generally concerned with operating these features but also with achieving 
non-functional properties such as scalability and dependability. For example, 
architecture in support of building CLASS for large-scale systems is concerned with 
supporting large, inter-institutional hierarchies of vendors, designers, suppliers, 
implementers, and regulators, in applying processes within lifecycles using guidance. 
The CLASS architecture is also interested in information and knowledge sharing, 
amongst other functional features to create a Safety Engineering Ecosystem. 
CLASS Phase 1 
CLASS phase 1 addressed the major issues that arose from the expansion of Assurance Based 
Development into the temporal, assurance, and application dimensions discussed in section 
CLASS Origins And Terminology above. 
CLASS phase 1 introduced the basic notion of a meta or generic overall lifecycle approach 
from which specific instances are instantiated for specific projects. To support this process 
picture, CLASS phase 1 introduced the general notion of a resource repository, the CLASS 
Resource Repository, to provide a source of materials through the associated project lifecycle. 
Separately, the Safety Information Repository was introduced that provides a well-defined 
structure for holding all of the project materials related to safety. The Safety Information 
Repository holds the safety case and all related materials along with operational data. 
Finally, CLASS phase 1 introduced an initial monitoring mechanism that linked assumptions 
made in safety arguments with experience of the system during operation. 
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Fundamental Principles 
At the highest level, the CLASS phase 1 concept is shown in Fig. 2. A subject system begins as 
a concept and passes through a series of world states over the system’s lifetime, beginning with 
design and development, and moving through operation and maintenance to 
decommissioning/retirement. 
 
Fig. 2. The CLASS concept. 
CLASS phase 1 was based on a set of fundamental principles that were used to guide its 
development. The principles evolved from: (a) the analysis of the sequence of CLASS 
prototypes, and (b) a basic goal of being able to analyze CLASS so as to try to predict its 
effectiveness. 
Many software development methodologies are defined by artifacts in addition to the system 
implementation. For example, tests guide development of an implementation in test driven 
development. Similarly, requirements driven development refines requirements to system 
implementation. Finally, in an enterprise architecture approach, architectural patterns 
demonstrate useful system properties and the implementation must in turn observe the 
architecture. 
Each of these approaches involves synchrony between a non-functional, analytic product 
and the functional system. This synchrony is a co-informing relationship, as depicted in Fig. 2. 
The functional system can inform the analytical product, and/or the analytical product can inform 
the functional system. Furthermore, the two cannot contradict each other, but are instead 
extrapolations of one another. Finally, just as the pieces of the functional system must be 
coherent, so must the analytic products. 
These concepts were adopted as an analytic principle in CLASS phase 1. In CLASS phase 
1, the non-functional, analytic product is the safety case, and the notion of synchrony that is 
inherent in these advanced software development methodologies is a fundamental principle of 
CLASS. 
The exact semantics of synchrony evolved over the three CLASS phases. We define the 
term here: 
Assurance Synchrony. Assurance synchrony is the property that an assurance case 
is in synchrony with the system about which it argues. For example, a safety case is in 
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synchrony with its system when all of its safety claims and evidence are true for the 
current implementation or furthest-so-far refinement of the system model. This further 
requires that all analytic products are coherent. For example, evidence and hazard 
analysis cannot be allowed to ignore or contradict one another. 
Assurance synchrony is the key property of the CLASS creation process. Failure of 
assurance can result from a failure of synchrony, or assurance synchrony fault. In this 
case, there is an underlying error in the assurance case, implementation, or both, such 
that a lack of synchrony exists between the two in the main image of the system. 
The principles upon which CLASS phase 1 rested are illustrated in Fig. 2. The principles are: 
• Composite Entity. The subject system and the associated safety case are treated as a 
single, composite entity. We refer to this entity as the System and Safety Case Pair 
(SSCP). This principle is a central, explicit element of CLASS. 
• Synchrony. Synchrony between the subject system and the associated safety case is 
maintained whenever they should be synchronized. Timing of synchronization is 
determined by analysis. A useful result of the introduction of the SSCP is that many 
elements of the basic CLASS process and overall CLASS analysis are put on a much 
more rigorous footing. 
• Assured Properties. The CLASS lifecycle process structure precludes the introduction 
of safety defects to the extent possible. Assurance of this process property is by 
analysis. 
• Monitoring. CLASS phase 1 was designed to undertake continuous monitoring during 
operation of assumptions made in the system safety case. Necessary sensors1 and 
monitoring algorithms are determined by analysis. This initial form of monitoring was 
motivated by the need to ensure that safety-case assumptions were respected during 
execution. In phases 2 and 3 the concept of monitoring was extended to include all 
aspect of the CLASS process over all time. With comprehensive monitoring in this way, 
properties that follow from the definition of the process are assured. 
The CLASS Meta Process 
CLASS needs to handle all of the world states that arise in system development, and, to 
accommodate variation in system types, CLASS is defined as a meta process that is 
instantiated for the specific configuration of a subject systems. This structure is shown in Fig. 3. 
The CLASS meta process, metaCLASS, provides lifecycle support for the SSCP. Fig. 4 
illustrates the basic metaCLASS instantiation mechanism and the major outputs of the 
associated instanceCLASS. Also shown in Fig. 4 is the Safety Information Repository (SIR). 
The SIR is a structure that holds the safety case and all related assets that result from the 
creation and use of an instanceCLASS for a subject system. The SIR is created as part of the 
instantiation process and is a lifetime entity permanently associated with the subject system, 
i.e., the SIR accompanies the system throughout the system’s lifetime. The SIR provides all of 
the artifacts needed to support the instanceCLASS as changes become necessary during the 
system lifetime. 
                                                
 
 
 
1 The term “sensor” in CLASS refers to any mechanism that provides CLASS with either a value or details of an event 
that are relevant to the monitoring process. For example, if a safety argument relies upon a component probability 
of failures being less than some specific value, then a sensor would be an element of a maintenance system that 
supplied CLASS with details of failure events and associated repairs. 
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Fig. 3. CLASS instantiation process deriving CLASS instances from metaCLASS. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 4. The primary elements of the CLASS instantiation process including the Safety Information 
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metaCLASS is composed of two basic components: 
• Development Component. The development component of metaCLASS along with the 
CLASS Resource Repository (CRR) supports development of instanceCLASS 
processes, both initially and over the system lifecycle. 
• Update Component. The update component of metaCLASS along with the CRR 
supports updates of instanceCLASS processes over the system lifecycle. 
Development Component 
An instanceCLASS is needed for any project using CLASS, and each instanceCLASS is 
created by metaCLASS using resources from the CRR. Once the instanceCLASS is created 
and the necessary activities needed for the system safety case initiated, metaCLASS remains in 
operation and available to provide lifecycle support. Additional resources can be obtained from 
the CRR at any point. 
The CLASS meta process provides access to the CLASS Resource Repository (CRR) using 
a set of access protocols designed to facilitate: 
• Location of useful resources. 
• Appropriate use of those resources. 
As an example of an access protocol, consider the resources needed for certification. In an 
aviation context, the resources needed for certification will be influenced by whether the subject 
system is for ground or airborne use, the criticality level of the subject system, the overall 
system requirements, and so on. The role of the access protocols in this case is to provide a 
means of locating the right versions of standards, process support entities, tools, regulatory 
mechanisms and so on. 
Update Component 
The update component of metaCLASS is responsible for ensuring that all 
instanceCLASSs remain properly synchronized with all available resource information. The 
resource update mechanism in CLASS is shown in Fig. 5. 
The issues that force interaction between instanceCLASS and metaCLASS arise from the 
temporal dimension of SSCP support: The problem that the update component is designed to 
address is best illustrated by the following examples: 
• Meta Resource Updates. Updates to resources within the CRR and the availability of 
new resources within the CRR need to be communicated to all instanceCLASSs that 
might have an interest in those resources, e.g., an instanceCLASS that was derived 
from those resources. This communication is especially important for defects that are 
detected and repaired in the CRR. As an example, consider the possibility of a defect in 
an argument pattern being detected. All safety cases relying on that pattern would need 
to be checked and possibly updated. 
• Instance Resource Updates. Necessary updates to CRR resources might be detected 
by an instanceCLASS that was instantiated using those resources. The CRR needs to 
be informed of such updates and then instanceCLASSs derived from those resources 
need to be informed. As an example, again consider the possibility of a defect in an 
argument pattern being detected in the instantiation being used by an instanceCLASS. 
Correcting that defect in the CRR and all derived instanceCLASSs is crucial. 
Updates must be coordinated. Effecting an update to either the CRR or the resources being 
used by an instanceCLASS in an unsynchronized manner could disrupt ongoing activities. 
Conversely, the CRR, metaCLASS and all instanceCLASSs need to be informed promptly of an 
update. 
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Fig. 5. CLASS resource update mechanism 
The CLASS update mechanism is divided into a Notifications component and a Resources 
component. A notification includes the details of an update but is, as their name indicates, 
merely to notify all interested processes of an update. Processes can then decide on the 
relevance and importance of the update. Notifications are “pushed” to all interested processes. 
instanceCLASSs notify metaCLASS of necessary updates, and metaCLASS manages the 
subsequent notifications to interested processes. 
The Resources element of the update mechanism in CLASS provides the mechanism for 
interested processes to acquire updated resources. Resources are “pulled” by the interested 
processes and so the installation of an update in under their control. 
The CLASS Instance Process 
The anticipated lifetime of systems supported by safety cases developed with CLASS is 
considerable, and so the associated SSCPs must be kept synchronized with the subject 
systems, i.e., the property of synchrony must be maintained. 
Fig. 6 illustrates this essential temporal component of the problem. As time passes, the 
world state changes. Areas in which changes might occur that could affect system safety 
include the system design, development environment, operating environment, and the mission 
requirements. 
The subject system has to operate with adequate safety from initial system deployment to 
system retirement. All of the development artifacts feed into safety assessment, as do all 
changes during operation. 
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Fig. 6. CLASS instance long-term operation 
The activities necessary to maintain SSCP synchrony are primarily the responsibility of 
instanceCLASS. Thus, an instanceCLASS has to have access to the necessary resources and 
has to be activated appropriately. 
A wide variety of types of information are used within a CLASS instance, and Fig. 7 is 
organized around these items of information and their flows through the structure. The key 
elements of the information flow structure are: 
• The safety case flow from the developers of the safety case to the regulating agency. 
Development of suitable regulatory certification processes is a key component of 
CLASS. 
• The safety case design flows to and from a variety of sources and sinks. The concept 
underlying the design flow is to ensure that the developers of the subject system and the 
associated safety case are properly apprised of the interests of other stakeholders. 
• The safety case data flow from various sources to various sinks. The concept underlying 
the safety-case data flow is to document precisely and rigorously the sources, sinks and 
content of data that is needed to support operational monitoring. 
An instanceCLASS in CLASS has the structure shown in Fig. 8. Important aspects of 
instanceCLASS are: 
• The explicit identification of the safety-case repair function and the merging of this 
function with the safety-case creation function. 
• The explicit introduction of a path for receipt and development of requirements for 
changes to the system and associated changes to the safety case. 
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Fig. 7. instanceCLASS information flow 
 
Fig. 8. instanceCLASS structure  
Safety Information Repository
Creation
Regulatory 
Approval
System in 
Operation
Monitor 
Operation
Repair
Assumptions 
& Contracts
Repair/Update
Requirements
TaxonomiesMonitor/DirectCreation
Monitor/Direct
Repair
External 
Sources of 
Change 
Requirements
Monitor/Direct
Design
LogAlert Log
Legend
Safety Case Flow
Safety Case Design Flow
Safety Case Data Flow
Operational 
Environment
CLASS SIR API
SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset
SIR Access
Regulatory Approval
Monitor Operation
Safety Case
Creation
Repair
Assumptions 
& Contracts
Repair/Update
Requirements
Monitor/Direct
Creation
Monitor/Direct
Repair
Log
System in Operation
Operating 
Environment
Maintenance 
Environment
Alert
External Change 
Requirements
External 
Environment
System Safety Engineering
System Engineering
Monitoring System Sensors
Safety Information Repository
CLASS SIR API
SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset SIR Asset
  12 
• The explicit introduction of monitoring during system operation. 
• The explicit introduction of the system operating environment into the system elements 
to be considered during operation. Clearly, monitoring a system in operation requires 
monitoring of the relevant details of the associated operating environment. 
• The central role of the Safety Information Repository (SIR). The SIR is present to 
maintain all the system safety information (see section Safety Information Repository 
below). 
CLASS Resource Repository 
The CLASS Resource Repository (CRR) supplies resources that metaCLASS uses to build an 
instanceCLASS. The expectation is that the CRR will provide resources of many types and 
permit a great deal of reuse across projects. 
Access to the CRR is through a set of Access Protocols. These protocols are designed to 
provide guidance to the user when accessing the CRR. The guidance is designed to take the 
user’s requirements and attempt to show the user the CRR material that is relevant to their 
goals and how it should be used. For example, consider an instantiation of CLASS that will be 
used for a large UAS in the NAS. This application will require a lot of material relevant to topics 
such as UAS hazard analysis, FAA guidance on operating in the NAS, FAA-approved standards 
for supporting development of the various UAS components, and so on. The Access Protocols 
are intended to guide the user in locating and selecting these relevant resources. 
The CLASS Resource Repository cannot be unique, i.e., there cannot be a single CRR that 
provides resources to all projects. Inevitably, any organization that is using CLASS will require 
organization-specific elements in the CRR. All instantiations of the CRR should be (though need 
not be) derived from a central facility so as take advantage of the common base of assets. 
Nevertheless, a tailoring mechanism is required to permit a generic CRR to be adapted to the 
needs of a specific organization. 
To accommodate the various modifications necessary within the CRR and to permit flexible 
use of those modifications, CLASS defines a hierarchy of CRRs. The CLASS CRR hierarchy is 
illustrated in Fig. 9. 
The hierarchy begins with a generic CRR used by metaCLASS. Along with the specific 
content designed to support CLASS, this generic CRR includes domain specific resource 
repositories that are provided by other sources. Examples of this type of repository are: 
• Standards and documentation repositories maintained by organizations such as the FAA 
and RTCA. 
• GSN pattern libraries maintained by organizations such as NASA and the University of 
York. 
• Software libraries that provide common services such as those available from AdaCore 
and Green Hills. 
At the next layer of the hierarchy are a set of local CRRs, each designed to support the 
metaCLASS operated by a specific organization, such as an aerospace system supplier. Each 
such CRR is adapted from the generic CRR to support the particular organization. 
Within a given organization, each instanceCLASS is created from the local CRR. As shown 
in Fig. 9, a set of instanceCLASSs within an organization is derived from the organization’s local 
CRR. 
The CLASS Resource Repository is not static. As shown in Fig. 3, over time updates or 
additional materials derived from external sources might be entered into the CRR. Other 
changes to the CRR might be motivated by either resource demands or determination of defects 
in resources as a result of their use. System instanceCLASSs might benefit from these updates 
or additional materials. In summary, the CRR is updated as needed from both external and 
internal sources. 
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Fig. 9. CLASS Resource Repository hierarchy 
No matter what the cause, changes in the CRR must be handled carefully, because 
changes to the CRR might disrupt an ongoing development. Enhanced resources might not be 
of immediate value to existing instanceCLASSs, and the decision about their adoption must be 
the responsibility of the individual instanceCLASS. Declining to enter a new or enhanced 
resource within the CRR might be preferable. Similarly, defects identified in resources by an 
instanceCLASS must be made available to other instanceCLASSs in order to protect the latter 
from the effects of the identified defect. Nevertheless, each instanceCLASS must be able to 
exercise explicit individual control over the action taken when resources are updated. 
The CRR hierarchy implements the metaCLASS update model for the CRR with the 
following characteristics (see Fig. 9): 
• Resource transfers are “pull” connections meaning that resources are transferred on 
demand. 
• Update notifications are “push” connections meaning that notifications are transferred 
when they are generated. 
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Safety Information Repository 
Each CLASS instance maintains a Safety Information Repository (SIR). The SIR is a sink for all 
of the information that flows in a CLASS instance and a source for that information also. The 
SIR expands the concept of a safety case to include all relevant information that might have 
value across the lifecycle. 
The role of the SIR in the overall CLASS architecture is shown in Fig. 4. The information 
flow of the subject system, the associated instanceCLASS, and the SIR is shown in more detail 
in Fig. 7. Fig. 8 shows the architecture of instanceCLASS and the interaction between the SIR 
and the rest of instanceCLASS. 
As examples of the role of the SIR, consider: (a) the safety case itself and (b) the results of 
operational monitoring of the subject system: 
• The safety case has to be accessible and available for update and repair at any point 
during the subject system’s lifecycle. The SIR provides this storage and access facility 
for the safety case and all associated information. 
• Operational monitoring is designed to check on the conformance of the subject system 
to the constraints upon which the safety case was built. Any deviations raise issues 
about system and safety case consistency and validity. Details of the monitoring record 
need to be available in an accessible and predefined form. The SIR provides this 
storage and access facility for the monitoring data and all associated information. 
The (preliminary) expected content of the SIR as defined in CLASS either in the form of the 
actual artifacts or links to the actual artifacts is: 
• A catalog of the artifacts contained within the SIR along with the dates of their creation, 
modification, etc. 
• The system’s safety case. 
• All source artifacts used to create the system’s safety case including: 
• All items of evidence. 
• The tools needed to reproduce the evidence. 
• The safety arguments. 
• All artifacts associated with the certification of the system via the safety case. 
• Logs of system maintenance. 
• Logs of system monitoring. 
As shown in Fig. 7 and Fig. 8, the SIR has an API that supports access and management of 
the SIR. For any lifecycle activity that involves safety-related information, processes that use the 
SIR through the API would be available. 
CLASS Phase 2 
CLASS phase 2 enhanced the basic structures established in phase 1 with a process-centric 
approach. The more abstract process concepts were established in phase 1 with metaCLASS 
and instanceCLASS. These concepts were made far more explicit in phase 2. 
The increased level of detail at the process level led to numerous other enhancements: 
• Detail process descriptions for the various activities in safety-critical system 
development that were driven by assurance goals. 
• An enhancement to the notion of monitoring (and hence to the requirements for the 
CLASS monitoring system) driven by the goal of assuring conformance during 
development to the process definitions. 
• A realization that process activities and conformance to the correct execution of these 
activities relate closely to the goal of developing systems with as few faults as possible. 
In CLASS phase 3, this realization then led to the elimination of indirect evidence from 
the types of evidence that need to be considered in CLASS. 
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• The development of a mechanism for allowing CLASS processes to be defined so that 
they produce direct rather than indirect evidence. 
In summary, CLASS phase 2 was a highly process-centric lifecycle. All of the elements of 
CLASS phase 1 were updated to accommodate the process-centric focus. Processes were 
defined using the Business Process Model and Notation 2 (BPMN2) defined by the Object 
Management Group. This notation provided a convenient and effective graphic representation of 
process ideas. Since the notation is graphic, process definitions can be edited electronically. In 
addition, the formal nature of BPMN2 allows machine processing of process descriptions 
thereby enabling input to be generated for workflow management systems. 
Process Concepts and Structure 
Details of the process concepts evolved for CLASS phase 2 are documented in a technical 
report (paper number 13 in section Bibliography of Published Papers below). For completeness, 
a summary of the material is provided here. 
CLASS phase 2 explored the role of process in creating an assured system. The key issues 
investigated were: 
• The mapping of software development methodology to the properties of synchronization, 
quality, and completeness. 
• The encoding of these mappings into concrete, automatable workflow processes written 
in the BMPN2 workflow language. 
• The demonstration of the application of these processes to the simulated creation of 
aircraft collision avoidance software. 
• Description and analysis of the lessons learned from this exercise. 
The critical issue in the mapping of software development methodology to CLASS is to 
ensure that the requirements of synchronization are met. As shown in Fig. 10, modern parallel 
software development processes can easily fail to synchronize correctly. 
 
Fig. 10. Parallel development and unplanned synchronization 
What is required is support for parallel development using a Spiral process model [6] with 
proper attention to synchronization of development and assurance activities. The CLASS overall 
process structure is shown in Fig. 11. 
In the CLASS process structure, the System Safety Case Pair (SSCP) are developed by 
teams operating with whatever degree of independence is considered appropriate for the overall 
project. The SSCP is shown at the top of the figure. Different development groups operate 
separate Spiral processes in parallel using a conventional methodology. These parallel spiral 
processes are shown in the center of the figure. 
Synchronization between development groups is achieved at the Synchronization Boundary 
shown at the top of the set of Spiral processes in the figure. This boundary allows independent 
developments to be combined and for the SSCP to once more be in synchrony. Issues and 
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necessary improvements together with assurance failures (such as would arise from the 
development of evidence) are stored for processing in a central tracking repository. 
 
Fig. 11. General CLASS process structure 
 
Fig. 12. CLASS process lifecycle as a BPMN2 process. A key to the graphics used in BPMN2 is available 
at: http://www.bpmb.de/images/BPMN2_0_Poster_EN.pdf. A tutorial on BPMN2 is available at: 
https://camunda.org/bpmn/tutorial/ 
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The use of a formal language to describe process structures brings many benefits. To 
explore this idea, many process ideas were defined in CLASS phase 2 using BPMN2. An 
example of the use of BPMN2 is shown in Fig. 12. 
The empirical studies carried out during CLASS phase 2 were designed to assess the 
process ideas that were developed. Many of the details of these process ideas, defined in 
BPMN2, are documented in the empirical studies report supplied to the sponsor under separate 
cover. 
CLASS Safety Case Development Process 
A specialized element of CLAS phase 2 was the development of the safety case development 
process. This process was developed to provide a framework for handling the interactions 
between all of the various stakeholders in the development of large safety cases. 
Inevitably, modern aviation systems will require large safety cases, and CLASS is a complex 
entity designed to support the development of large safety cases. The safety case component of 
system development requires a substantial team of engineers to interact in complex ways over 
extended periods of time with a wide variety of dependencies between their various activities. 
Just as with any large development, uncertainties arise over what actions are needed, the effort 
level required, the approach to be followed, and so on. 
The CLASS safety-case development process (a sub-process within an instanceCLASS) is 
based on a Spiral model [6]. The Spiral model captures and expands on both the practical and 
conceptual aspects of the established Early and Often development process [1]. The CLASS 
Spiral model also deals with the process elements that arise because of the anticipated scale of 
the safety cases of interest. 
A CLASS instance has to support the four major phases of the safety-case lifecycle: 
• Creation.  
• Certification. 
• Operation 
• Maintenance.  
In providing this support, the instanceCLASS development sub-process has to accommodate 
multiple inputs including: 
• Artifacts used in developing the safety case including required content and formats 
necessary for certification. 
• Questions and argument challenges resulting from the deliberations of the certifying 
authority. 
• Data observed during operation that relates to the execution-time checking of safety 
claims. 
•  Maintenance requirements. 
In addition, the instanceCLASS development sub-process must be able to inform engineers 
in a variety of ways about the exact state of the lifecycle. As part of this requirement, 
instanceCLASS must be able to provide alerts to conditions defined by engineers as requiring 
attention. 
To address these lifecycle requirements, a major component of the instanceCLASS design 
is the system’s workflow infrastructure. This structure is the basis upon with the Spiral model is 
constructed. The workflow infrastructure does not control or define the workflow. Rather the 
workflow infrastructure provides status information about: 
• The safety case and all associated artifacts. This status information allows engineers 
throughout the lifecycle to examine the state of the safety case in order to support 
assessment. 
• The work flows in the lifecycle. This status information identifies the crucial parameters 
of the workflow, the steps required to complete it, and the state of each workflow. 
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In order to represent the relationships between components (workflow items) tracked in the 
workflow fully, a fairly complex data model is required. 
Arguments are decomposed into related components that are described in the workflow as 
argument tasks. These tasks are typically smaller than a single argument, but may include sub-
graphs from multiple, related arguments. For example, tasks might include: 
• Top-level argument structure. 
• Functional hazards. 
• Hardware boundaries. 
• Software functions. 
Some of these — such as software functions — will require direct evidence whereas others 
— like the top-level argument structure — might not. Each argument task has a well-defined set 
of activities that are required to complete it: 
1. Drafting: Development of initial argument structure, in consultation with domain experts. 
2. Assignment: Identification and association of ownership teams (consisting of a regulator 
and a subject-matter expert) who will be responsible for completing and overseeing the 
development and approval of the sub-graph associated with the argument task. 
3. Pre-validation: Acceptance of ownership and initial vetting of the draft argument structure. 
4. Validation: Elaboration and review of the argument structure, to ensure that the logic is 
complete and correct. 
5. Evidence Negotiation: Development of evidence requirements for terminal or leaf claims in 
the argument structure. 
6. Approval: Acceptance of evidence and, therefore, of the top-most claims in each sub-graph 
associated with the argument task. 
During the assignment activity, several ownership teams might be associated with smaller 
sub-graphs of the argument task’s GSN; each argument task may therefore have many 
instances of activities 3 through 6. 
One of the tools in the CLASS SCT, the Workflow Management System, allows details of 
the workflow to be determined. 
CLASS Resource Repository 
As part of CLASS phase 2, a number of new resource concepts were developed, and these 
were added to the CRR. The enhancements to the CRR are illustrated on the left of Fig. 13. 
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Fig. 13. Enhancements to the CLASS Resource Repository. 
The resource concepts added to the CRR in phase 2 were: 
• An initial model of expert judgment. The model is based upon the expert-judgment 
processes used by: (a) the medical profession in diagnosis, and (b) the FAA in software 
approval. The model is explained in depth in paper number 6 in section Bibliography of 
Published Papers below. 
• Illustrative samples of a rigorous argument added to the RTCA standard DO-178B. 
This material was developed to improve the access to assurance and safety arguments 
by practicing engineers. The concept is explained in depth in paper number 9 in section 
Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
• The concept of the rationalized standard. A rationalized standard is designed to 
provide a stronger basis for defining safety standards. The concept is explained in depth 
in paper number 2 in section Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
• An initial knowledge management process concept. The concept was expanded and 
enhanced in CLASS phase 3 as was a preliminary prototype support toolset. The phase 
3 versions are explained in depth in paper number 10 and paper number 3 in section 
Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
• The concept of domain-specific arguments. In a production setting, the CRR would 
contain sample domain-specific arguments to support various domains of interest. The 
concept of domain-specific arguments was developed extensively in CLASS phase 3, 
and small examples developed to assess and illustrate the concept. 
The intent throughout this research project was to enhance the CRR concept and content as 
new aspects of CLASS were developed. In phase 2, the major enhancements outlined about 
moved the CRR from a document-oriented repository to a process-oriented repository in which 
documents were associated with useful processes and process fragments. 
Expert Judgment 
The notion of expert judgment is central to the application of inductive logic, and CLASS relies 
upon expert judgment. During CLASS phase 2, the idea of examining and possibly refining the 
concept of expert judgment was introduced. Expert judgment is a critical component of virtually 
all safety and assurance cases. Engineers appeal to expert judgment whenever an assessment 
is required but there is no quantitative basis for the assessment. 
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During CLASS phase 2, several existing techniques for expert judgment were analyzed and 
the core elements of two were used to build an initial model of expert judgment for CLASS. The 
initial model was expanded in CLASS phase 3. 
The concept is explained in depth in paper number 6 in section Bibliography of Published 
Papers below. 
Integration with Existing Standards 
CLASS introduces numerous new concepts and technologies. An important question that 
became prominent in CLASS phase 2 was how CLASS in general and safety cases in particular 
could be integrated into existing practice. 
An initial effort was made to investigate this question by seeing how a safety case could be 
integrated into an existing software assurance standard. Given the domain of interest for 
CLASS, the standard chosen was RTCA DO-178B [7]. 
A mechanism was developed to provide a bridge between existing practices that are based 
on ad hoc processes associated with DO-178B and the use of a safety case as a fundamental 
engineering asset. The mechanism was developed with extensive consultation with the FAA 
DERs who are part of the research team. The major conclusion of the work is that the poorly 
defined objectives in DO-178B/C and the associated ad hoc audit mechanisms can be placed 
on a rigorous basis by requiring that developers prepare rigorous arguments to justify belief in 
their system meeting the standard’s objectives. 
The results of the exercise were quite positive. The concept is explained in depth in paper 
number 9 in section Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
Safety Case Condition Monitoring 
The CLASS monitoring concept was expanded considerably in CLASS phase 2. The emphasis 
in CLASS phase 2 was on process, and the importance of following processes completely and 
correctly is well understood. 
Given that CLASS employs a monitoring system, the idea of expanding monitoring to cover 
conformance to prescribed processes was introduced in CLASS phase 2. The change required 
very little modification to the design of the monitoring system, because its original design was 
completely general. The only significant enhancement that was required was the development 
of new sensors. 
Despite this change, the potential of process monitoring was not fully understood in CLASS 
phase 2. In phase 3, the process-monitoring concept was enhanced by driving the monitoring 
off of the basic CLASS analysis mechanism. This concept is explained in the next section. 
CLASS Phase 3 
During the development of CLASS phase 2 extensive interactions with practicing engineers 
were undertaken in empirical studies of the process-related ideas. This interaction led to 
development of various argument and process artifacts that were used to evaluate the principles 
of CLASS phase 2. Based on the results of the empirical studies conducted during CLASS 
phase 2 (and partially from those in CLASS phase 1), we concluded that: (a) the focus of 
CLASS on process was too restrictive, and (b) the notion of basing assurance on a safety case 
as usually practiced was also too restrictive. 
The focus of CLASS on process was found to have two fundamental limitations: 
• The only “variable” available in the design of CLASS in phase 2 was the process. In 
other words, in order to effect some desirable outcome, the primary mechanism needed 
to be a previously defined process. 
• Domain experts did not find that extremely detailed process concepts were either easy 
to understand or easy to follow. More importantly, it was difficult for them to understand 
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why detailed prescriptive processes were necessary and hence what value these 
processes had. 
The notion of basing assurance on a safety case as usually practiced was found to have two 
fundamental limitations also: 
• The value of safety cases to domain experts was not as high as we expected. The 
acceptance of safety cases within the community depends, in part, on their perceived 
value. We identified assurance arguments that were being created and used by domain 
experts entirely separately from safety cases. 
• As intended, the emphasis in CLASS phases 1 and 2 was on the safety case. This 
emphasis we found to be too rigid in that all of the tools and technologies were limited to 
a single piece of information, the safety case. We identified many opportunities for 
generalizing the concepts being developed to be a broader approach to the knowledge 
of domain experts. 
With these observations, CLASS phase 3 was developed based on a domain-centric model. 
This model easily encompassed everything that had been developed in CLASS phases 1 and 2. 
The safety case is merely one form of information involving several domains. Similarly, 
processes and process models are merely a different form of information, again involving 
several domains. 
Once the notion of a domain-centric model was established, then the idea of making the 
model an “open” model immediately emerged. By open we mean that: 
• Access to domain information is not and need not be restricted except to protect 
proprietary interests. Good ideas, examples, better ideas, and various artifacts can be 
added to the available information. 
• Domains and domain information is at the heart of approval. Standards and their 
interpretation are merely examples of domain information. A standard, viewed as 
information can be approved by a regulating agency, consulted by engineers, and 
discussed by engineers based on experience. Interfaces and controls to: (a) facilitate 
information access, (b) provide repositories of information related to information, and (c) 
facilitate social processes of discussion and debate are possible. 
CLASS phase 3 pursued these ideas in order to explore their potential. Clearly, the CLASS 
Resource Repository had a significant role to play in the enhancements undertaken in CLASS 
phase 3. The CRR is the domain information repository, and so the idea of a domain-centric 
model for CLASS makes the CRR the focus. 
In the original CLASS concept, the CLASS Resource Repository (CRR) was designed to 
provide resources that users could exploit in the development of safety cases. Subsequently, 
that idea was broadened slightly to include materials that were viewed as central to the 
aerospace application domain but still limited to resources relevant to safety cases. In CLASS 
phase 3, the CRR: 
• Contains a broad range of resources. 
• Is a central repository of artifacts of all types including examples of argument templates, 
processes, tools, references, standards, and questions. 
• Provides a central facility for comment and discussion about the various items in the 
CRR. Such discussions might lead to updates to other domain resources, and thereby 
provides a mechanism for keeping domain resources accurate and up to date. 
The major advantages that these changes provide are: 
• Users of the CRR will be able to access much, perhaps all, of the resources needed to 
undertake a system development. 
• All of the resources can be kept up to date and updated as necessary, rather than 
remaining available but either not updated or only updated only after extensive delay. 
• Useful variants of resources can be developed over time and made available to the 
community. 
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Process Model 
To support the enhanced CRR and the concept of generalized domain information resources, 
the high-level CLASS process was generalized. The generalized form is shown in Fig. 14. 
The process concept breaks down into two major components: Domain Engineering shown 
in the lower half of Fig. 14, and Product Engineers shown in the upper half of Fig. 14. On the left 
of the figure is the CLASS Resource Repository. The CRR has now become the holder of a 
wide variety of resources designed to support both Domain Engineering and Product 
Engineering. On the right of the figure is the new Process Support Toolset. The toolset is also 
designed to support both Domain Engineering and Product Engineering. 
An important characteristic of the Domain Engineering model is that process and assurance 
are treated equally. This characteristic is illustrated in the figure by the notion that properties are 
spread across the combination of assurance and process. The original goal with CLASS was to 
focus on safety by making the system safety case the focus on process activities. This goal has 
been generalized by taking all the CLASS concepts and generalizing their focus. 
A second important characteristic of the Domain Engineering model is the notion of constant 
assessment and improvement. This characteristic is illustrated in the figure as the iteration 
denoted by the arrow loop. 
 
Fig. 14. Enhanced CLASS process concept with tool support and interface to CRR. 
An important characteristic of the Product Engineering model is that engineering 
development and assurance are treated equally. The original goal with CLASS was to focus on 
safety by making the system safety case the focus on process activities. Taking all the CLASS 
concepts and expanding their focus have generalized this goal. 
Engineering Improvement 
Process
Fetch
Product Engineering
Domain Engineering
Assurance Process
Properties
Engineering Development 
Process
System 
Knowledge
Assurance
Other
Instantiation
System 
Artifacts
Notify
Synchrony
Monitoring
Domain Engineering
Re
so
ur
ce
 R
ep
os
ito
ry
Process Support Toolset
   23 
Expert Judgment 
In CLASS phase 2, the role of expert judgment was introduced as a fundamental element of 
CLASS. This was done, because of the crucial role that expert judgment plays in the assurance 
of safety-critical systems. 
In CLASS phase 2, expert judgment was characterized with a model that had been derived 
from two other domains. When applying that model, a weakness was found that limited the 
model’s value. The problem was that the model was entirely prescriptive and provided no 
mapping from those prescriptive elements to the desired judgment accuracy. 
This problem is identical to the problem with most existing, prescriptive safety standards: no 
rationale is provided for the guidance. This problem with existing safety standards was the 
motivation for introducing the concept of rationalized standards in CLASS phase 2. 
The same solution is being pursued to complete the model of expert judgment. That work is 
incomplete. 
Analysis Framework 
CLASS is designed to support the development of safety-critical systems. Clearly, an important 
goal of the development process is to maximize the desired dependability of the subject system. 
To do so, CLASS has to be designed to minimize the defects in the subject system. This goal 
requires the introduction into CLASS of mechanisms to achieve this minimization. 
A question that arises immediately is: what techniques should be used and how would 
developers know of their efficacy? The CLASS Analysis Framework answers this question. 
The CLASS Analysis Framework is based upon the Filter Model introduced by Steele and 
Knight [5]. The framework is designed to analyze CLASS itself so as to provide explicit support 
for rigorous statements about properties of the subject system. The framework principle is to 
enable examination of CLASS based on a list of desired properties of the subject system and to 
determine the extent to which class precludes the introduction of defects that could make a 
property false. If the framework can show that CLASS avoids the introduction of or enables the 
complete elimination of a class of defects, then that result translates immediately into a property 
of the desired system. 
The principle upon which the framework is based is to treat CLASS itself as a safety critical 
system. In other words, allowing a defect to be introduced into or allowing a defect to remain in 
a subject system is considered an accident. With that concept in place, the framework can apply 
all of the techniques used in safety engineering to reduce the residual risk associated with 
CLASS. Techniques that can be applied include hazard identification, hazard analysis, fault-tree 
analysis, failure-modes-effects-and-criticality analysis, hazard-and-operability analysis, and so 
on. The concept upon which the framework rests is shown in Fig. 15. 
CLASS has eliminated the need for indirect evidence by introducing the framework. By 
analyzing CLASS in the manner outlined above, everything undertaken in CLASS leads to 
rigorous statements about the subjects system and the necessary evidence to support the 
associated claim. Thus, the framework feeds directly and immediately into the safety case for 
the subject system. 
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Fig. 15. CLASS Analysis Framework principles 
 
Fig. 16. The CLASS monitoring system architecture. 
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Development Process Monitoring 
A high level of assurance is required that all process steps been followed correctly and in the 
correct order if the process evidence of an instanceCLASS is to be treated as direct evidence. 
This assurance requires monitoring, and this indicated the need to expand the CLASS 
monitoring system comprehensively to include process monitoring. 
The architecture of the system is illustrated in Fig. 16. All relevant environments 
(development, operation, maintenance, etc.) are instrumented with sensors that are read 
according to a prescribed schedule. Sensor data is placed in a data repository that is referenced 
as necessary by the state predicates. These predicates define states of interest to the 
monitoring system, and are enabled/disabled by a triggering mechanism. 
State predicates define events if they recognize a state of interest, and these events are 
supplied to a set of state recognizers by the event bus. State recognizers are finite-state 
machines that pass through states upon receipt of predefined events. When they enter a 
final/terminating state, they emit one of more events that cause prescribed notification 
mechanism(s) to act. 
The CLASS monitoring system is explained in depth in paper number 8 in section 
Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
Certification 
CLASS addresses certification as a fundamental part of the entire lifecycle from system concept 
formation to system decommissioning and bases certification on the system safety case. This 
explicit attention to certification across all of the lifecycle phases is manifested in the following 
considerations: 
• The development phase of the lifecycle must ensure that artifacts developed support 
certification throughout the remainder of the lifecycle. Changes in either the system or 
the operating environment will require re-certification. 
• The operation and maintenance phases of the lifecycle must be prepared to support 
certification of revised versions of the subject system irrespective of the cause of the 
revision. 
• The primary focus of certification will be with the lifecycle phase following development 
and preceding deployment. The focus must be supported by both artifact structures and 
processes that maximize the value and minimize the cost of certification to all of the 
system stakeholders and the regulating agency. 
Although the safety case is the basis of certification, the entire certification process is 
informed by the likely need to meet the requirements of a regulating agency. In the case of 
aviation systems (the primary application domain of interest in CLASS), the regulating agency 
involved is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). CLASS provides a framework within 
which adequacy of protection of the public interest as defined by the FAA can be determined. 
CLASS is designed specifically and deliberately to ensure that elements of CLASS can be 
adjusted as necessary to meet the needs of the FAA. 
In CLASS, the safety case combines and structures many items that would normally be 
identified and elicited separately as part of existing certification mechanisms. By definition, the 
safety case documents the rationale for belief in the adequacy of the safety of the subject 
system, and maintenance of the safety case across the complete lifecycle facilitates the 
requisite certification activities. 
Since the CLASS Analysis Framework allows indirect evidence about the subject system to 
be eliminated, the doubts about the properties of a system that are engendered by indirect 
evidence are avoided. The CLASS monitoring mechanism provides a high level of confidence 
that the expected properties established by the Analysis Framework will be true. Thus, the 
starting point for certification is a safety case for the subject system with properties established 
by direct evidence in which stakeholders and certifiers can have high confidence. 
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Fig. 17. The safety case audit process. 
The CLASS certification approach is based on the work of Graydon, Knight, and Green [8]. 
The approach is composed logically of two significant audit phases that are expected to be 
accomplished by experts from the regulating agency. For the FAA, these experts would be 
licensed Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs). The audit phases are: 
• Process Audit. By design, CLASS precludes faults in a wide variety of categories. In 
other words, provided CLASS is used properly, the resulting system should be 
demonstrably free of faults in certain categories. The details of the categories of faults 
that are precluded together with all the associated evidence for the subject system are 
contained in the safety case. Despite the role of both the Analysis Framework and the 
Monitoring System, an audit is required to confirm to the extent possible that the claimed 
properties of the subject system are present. 
• Safety Case Audit. By definition, the safety case describes the rationale for belief in the 
safety of the subject system. Thus the second audit need not examine the product. 
Rather, the safety of the subject system should be argued in a compelling manner by the 
safety case. The second audit is of the safety case. Many aspects are examined in the 
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audit including a variety of simple yet important properties. The main emphasis of the 
product audit is the assessment of the degree to which the safety argument has the 
essential properties of being comprehensive, valid, and compelling. In CLASS these 
properties are established by a rigorous inspection process based on the technology of 
Phased Inspections originally design for software inspection. 
The overall organization of the safety case audit is illustrated in Fig. 17. Full details of the 
audit process are available elsewhere [8]. 
Empirical Studies 
As noted throughout this report, various empirical studies have been conducted at various times 
and with various goals throughout the research project’s duration. The results of these studies 
have affected CLASS profoundly at a variety of stages. Many specimen artifacts were created 
by these empirical studies. 
A detailed report of the most significant empirical studies has been supplied to the sponsor 
under separate cover. Some of the key results in the field of domain arguments are presented in 
paper number 1 in section Bibliography of Published Papers below. 
Bibliography of Published Papers 
The majority of the scientific results from the project reported here are documented in 
conference papers and technical reports. This section provides a list of those publications 
together with the abstract for each one. In some cases more than one paper discussed the 
same topic. This apparent duplication is either because the later paper is a refined version of an 
earlier paper, or because the papers present a wider study of the topic. All of the papers are 
cited here for completeness and are available through the Dependable Computing website: 
http://www.dependablecomputing.com/class 
In brief, paper 1, presents and analyzes the notion of domain arguments. Paper 2 introduces 
a new concept for safety standards called rationalized standards. The design and 
implementation of the CLASS server toolset are presented in paper 3. A rigorous approach to 
expert judgment is discussed in paper 4, and paper 5 is an annotated bibliography on expert 
judgment. Paper 6 presents a comprehensive model of expert judgment, and paper 7 is a 
summary of CLASS. The CLASS monitoring system is discussed in paper 8, and paper 9 
presents an approach to integrating an assurance case into the structure and use of the RTCA 
DO-178B software assurance standard. Paper 10 introduces the notion of an assurance 
knowledge ecology upon which CLASS phase 3 is built. The mechanism of certification as it 
might be instantiated for an agency such as the FAA is presented in paper 11. Paper 12 is a 
survey of the literature on lifecycle technology. Paper 13 presents an early version of the 
CLASS monitoring system, and paper 14 discusses the mechanism by which assurance is 
analyzed in CLASS. Finally, paper 15 describes the SCT safety case toolkit. 
Details of the papers follow. 
1. Jonathan Rowanhill and John C. Knight, Domain Arguments in Safety Critical Software 
Development, submitted to 27th International Symposium on Software Reliability 
Engineering (ISSRE), Ottawa, Canada (October 2016) 
Abstract. This paper explores domain arguments—arguments about why techniques, 
processes, and designs possess properties as believed by their domain experts. An 
elicitation technique for their recovery from domain documents is presented. This is followed 
by demonstrated application of the technique to several domain artifacts from aviation 
engineering. The elicited arguments are presented and analyzed for their properties. The 
inherent importance of such arguments is discussed as well as their potential contribution to 
system assurance arguments such as the safety case. 
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2. John C. Knight and Jonathan Rowanhill, The Indispensable Role Of Rationale In Safety 
Standards, International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security 
SAFECOMP, Trondheim, Norway (September 2016) 
Abstract. In this paper, we argue that standards, especially those intended to support 
critical applications, should define explicitly both the properties expected to accrue from use 
of the standard and an explicit rationale that justifies the contents of the standard. Current 
standards do not include an explicit, comprehensive rationale. Without a rationale, the use, 
maintenance, and revision of standards is unnecessarily difficult. We introduce a new 
concept for standards, the rationalized standard. A rationalized standard combines: (a) an 
explicit goal defining a property desired for conformant systems, (b) guidance that, if 
followed correctly, should yield an entity with the property stated in the goal, and (c) the 
rationale showing the reasoning why there is assurance with reasonable confidence that a 
conformant entity will have the property defined by the goal. We illustrate the utility of an 
explicit rationale using an existing safety standard, ISO 26262. 
3. Jonathan Rowanhill, CLASS Server Toolset: Design and Implementation, Dependable 
Computing Technical Report 2016-01 (May 2016) 
Abstract. The goal of the Comprehensive Lifecycle for Assurance of System Safety 
(CLASS) is to obtain assurance for relevant elements of a domain over their lifecycle. The 
Server Toolset provides an infrastructure that supports all of the information in a domain, 
i.e., an area of knowledge. The notion of “support” in this case means supporting: (a) all 
aspects of information management, (b) all phases of the system lifecycle, and (c) all 
elements of assurance, including the CLASS concept of synchrony. The toolset combines 
state-of-the-art software project management and knowledge capture and management 
technologies with custom software and powerful tools developed elsewhere. 
4. Patrick McGee and John Knight, A Rigorous Approach To Expert Judgment In The 
Engineering Of Safety-Critical Systems, pending. 
5. Patrick McGee and John Knight, An Annotated Bibliography of Expert Judgment, University 
of Virginia, Department of Computer Science, Technical Report CS-2016-02 (May 2016) 
Abstract. Expert judgment is an important element of decision making in many areas of 
engineering. Although quantitative methods are usually preferred in assurance, necessary 
probabilities frequently cannot be determined and then engineers have to resort to the 
judgment of experts. Obviously, this situation leads to concern about how accurate the 
judgments of experts are. Accurate judgments are particularly important in systems for 
which the consequences of failure are high, such as security- and safety-critical systems. 
This report is an annotated bibliography on expert judgment. 
6. Patrick McGee and John C. Knight, Expert Judgment in Assurance Cases, 10th IET System 
Safety and Cyber Security Conference, Bristol UK (October 2015) 
Abstract. Quantitative methods are usually preferred in safety assessment, but, frequently, 
necessary probabilities cannot be determined accurately. As a result, expert judgment plays 
a significant role in safety arguments and system deployment decisions. Trust in expert 
judgment is based on the assumption that the expert’s experience, knowledge, and training 
will enable the expert to make a suitable decision. The record indicates, however, that this 
assumption does not always hold and that decisions tend to be ad hoc and unprincipled. In 
this paper we present an analysis of expert judgment and a rigorous process for utilizing 
expert judgment in safety arguments. 
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7. John Knight, Jonathan Rowanhill, Anthony Aiello, and Kimberly Wasson, A Comprehensive 
Safety Lifecycle, ASSURE 2015: The 3rd International Workshop on Assurance Cases for 
Software-Intensive Systems, Delft, The Netherlands (September 2015) 
Abstract. CLASS is a novel approach to the safety engineering and management of safety-
critical systems in which the system safety case becomes the focus of safety engineering 
throughout the system lifecycle. CLASS expands the role of the safety case across all 
phases of the system’s lifetime, from concept formation and problem definition to 
decommissioning. Having the system safety case as the focus of safety engineering and 
management only has value if the safety case is properly engineered and appropriately 
consistent with the system. To achieve these properties, CLASS requires that a system and 
its safety case be regarded as a single composite entity, always linked and always correctly 
representing one another. CLASS introduces new techniques for the creation, approval and 
maintenance of safety cases, a rigorous analysis mechanism that allows determination of 
properties that relate to defect detection in subject systems, and a set of software support 
tools. 
8. John Knight, Jonathan Rowanhill, and Jian Xiang, A Safety Condition Monitoring System, 
ASSURE 2015: The 3rd International Workshop on Assurance Cases for Software-Intensive 
Systems, Delft, The Netherlands (September 2015) 
Abstract. In any safety argument, belief in the top-level goal depends upon a variety of 
assumptions that derive from the system development process, the operating context, and 
the system itself. If an assumption is false or becomes false at any point during the lifecycle, 
the rationale for belief in the safety goal might be invalidated and the safety of the 
associated system compromised. Assurance that assumptions actually hold when they are 
supposed to is not guaranteed, and so monitoring of assumptions might be required. In this 
paper, we describe the Safety Condition Monitoring System, a system that permits 
comprehensive yet flexible monitoring of assumptions throughout the entire lifecycle 
together with an alert infrastructure that allows tailored responses to violations of 
assumptions. An emphasis of the paper is the approach used to run-time monitoring of 
assumptions derived from software where the software cannot be easily changed. 
9. John Knight, Jonathan Rowanhill, Uma Ferrell, Alec Bateman, Neha Gandhi, Integrating An 
Assurance Case Into DO-178B Compliant Software Development, 34th IEEE/AIAA 34th 
Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), Prague, Czech Republic (September 2015) 
Abstract. Software assurance in the aviation industry is closely tied to compliance with 
RTCA DO-178B. In this paper, we introduce an approach to enhancing the value of DO-
178B using a software assurance case. The heart of the approach is to use an assurance 
case to link the detailed development techniques chosen by developers to the objectives 
defined in the guidance in a rigorous way. The assurance case documents precisely and 
explicitly the developers’ rationale for stating that the objectives have been satisfied. The 
use of an assurance case has three major advantages: (1) the contributions to assurance of 
the technologies used in development are documented and can be examined to determine 
weaknesses and omissions, (2) the system’s stakeholders can scrutinize the assurance 
case to assess completeness of software assurance, and (3) auditors can guide their 
analyses of the subject system using the assurance case. We present details of the 
approach and illustrate the approach by applying it to the planning phase of DO-178B. We 
show how savings elsewhere in development yielded by the enhancement approach can 
accommodate the cost of the assurance case itself. 
The approach can be adapted easily to DO-178C. 
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10. Jonathan Rowanhill and John Knight, CLASS Assurance Knowledge Ecology, Dependable 
Computing Technical Report TR2015-1 (May 2015) 
Abstract. We propose Assurance Knowledge Ecology. By inverting ownership of arguments 
away from generalist experts and towards domain knowledge experts, ownership and 
competitive fitness of arguments break down the ad-hoc, expensive, and static nature of 
system assurance. This model recognizes that domains of engineering already have 
assurance arguments. They are merely implicit. By encouraging domains to make their 
knowledge explicit, it can be continuously improved and rendered available to system 
arguments. Arguments exist and are owned in subject matter experts’ domains first, rather 
than from the needs of individual systems. System arguments, in turn, are derived therefrom 
and are test cases against domain knowledge. A model of this ecology is presented, and an 
experiment conducted in explicating domain arguments. 
11. Jonathan Rowanhill, John Knight, and Uma Ferrell, CLASS System Certification, 
Dependable Computing Technical Report TR2014-4 (December 2014) 
Abstract. CLASS addresses certification as a fundamental part of the entire lifecycle from 
system concept formation to system decommissioning, and bases certification on the 
system safety case. The safety case combines and structures many items that would 
normally be identified and elicited separately as part of existing certification mechanisms. By 
definition, the safety case documents the rationale for belief in the adequacy of the safety of 
the subject system, and maintenance of the safety case across the complete lifecycle 
facilitates the requisite certification activities. CLASS includes an Analysis Framework that 
allows indirect evidence about the subject system to be eliminated, and so the doubts in the 
properties of a system that are engendered by indirect evidence are avoided. CLASS also 
includes a monitoring mechanism which provides a high level of confidence that the 
expected properties established by the Analysis Framework will be true. In order to conform 
to the requirements of regulating agencies, CLASS certification includes two audit phases 
that are expected to be accomplished by experts from the regulating agency. For the FAA, 
these experts would be licensed Designated Engineering Representatives (DERs). 
12. Jonathan Rowanhill, CLASS Lifecycle Technology Survey, Dependable Computing 
Technical Report TR2014-3 (December 2014) 
Abstract. In this paper, we review the state of the art in lifecycle technology and use the 
results to analyze early CLASS prototypes. The result of the analysis led to substantial 
modifications to CLASS. An engineered system can be modeled with a lifecycle describing 
the temporal phases of its existence. Engineering systems with safety properties must 
consider safety of the system in each and every phase. Thus, a lifecycle model of a system 
is an excellent representation through which to prescribe safety processes and concerns. 
CLASS is designed to “enhance system safety in which the safety case becomes the focus 
of safety throughout the system lifecycle”. CLASS defines lifecycles for systems with strict 
safety requirements. The central role of the safety case supports the analytical rigor required 
to both develop a safe system and reasonably assure safety. With safety cases as the 
focus, CLASS lifecycles highlight the relationship between the system’s safety, safety 
arguments, and supporting evidence. These arguments and evidence are: 
• Documents: inherently language-based communication between people and tool. 
• Rigorous: structured and well-defined in order to reduce ambiguity and maintain 
precision. About systems: made to support systems. 
• Safety focused: focused on system safety. 
• Managed: living documents that must be accessed and modified over time. 
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There are lifecycle models defined separately for each of these attributes. These models 
have been used to enhance CLASS. 
13. Jonathan Rowanhill and John Knight, CLASS Safety Condition Monitoring System, 
Dependable Computing Technical Report TR2014-2 (December 2014) 
Abstract. CLASS safety analysis depends on assumptions about the correct 
implementation of the development process for the subject system and the associated 
safety case. In the event that an assumption is false or becomes false during system 
development, the rationale for belief in a claim within a safety argument might be invalidated 
and the safety of the associated system compromised. Assumptions are also made within 
safety arguments, and these assumptions made during development of the safety argument 
must remain true throughout the lifecycle, especially during operation. Assurance that both 
types of assumptions actually hold when they are supposed to is not guaranteed, and so 
monitoring of assumptions is essential. Monitoring the development of a system and 
monitoring the system itself during operation to check for violations of assumptions made in 
the system’s safety argument is an important aspect of the system safety lifecycle. The 
CLASS Safety Condition Monitoring System provides comprehensive monitoring of the 
assumptions made in both the system development process and the system’s safety 
argument together with an alert infrastructure that allows flexible responses to violations of 
assumptions. 
14. Jonathan Rowanhill and John Knight, CLASS Analysis Framework, Dependable Computing 
Technical Report TR2014-1 (December 2014) 
Abstract. CLASS is designed to support the safety assurance of a system over the system’s 
entire lifecycle. Major goals of CLASS are: (a) to provide sufficient structure to the process 
that faults arising in the target system from lifecycle process defects are reduced to the 
extent possible, and (b) to include within the lifecycle process techniques and methods that 
avoid or eliminate classes of defects. In this paper, we present the CLASS Analysis 
Framework, a framework designed to determine the extent to which CLASS achieves these 
goals. The theory upon which the Analysis Framework is based is a technique known as the 
Filter Model that was developed in separate research. A preliminary application of the 
technique to a hypothetical CLASS instantiation is described. 
15. M. Anthony Aiello, Ashlie B. Hocking, John Knight, Jonathan Rowanhill, SCT: A Safety Case 
Toolkit, International Workshop on Assurance Cases for Software-intensive Systems 
(ASSURE 2014), Naples IT (November 2014) 
Abstract. SCT is a safety case toolkit designed to support the development and 
maintenance of safety cases for large, safety-critical systems. SCT supports safety case 
development by providing facilities to manage the file structure associated with the safety 
case, editors for various notations including GSN, and a build system that creates a custom 
web site to store the safety case. The web-based representation of the safety case includes 
a variety of features for safety case examination including comprehensive hyperlinking of 
elements, a GSN viewer, an argument index, and various custom reports. 
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